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Detroit vs. Tokyo 
Back in the 1950's, a Bank of Japan governor 
said, "There is no reason to bel ieve that we in 
Japan may stay competitive with imported 
cars. Stop manufacturing passenger cars in 
Japan!/I Japanese automakers decided to ig-
nore his advice. Millions of  people associated 
with the u.S. auto industry (but not u.s. 
consumers) are now sorry that they did. 
In  1980, Japan became the world's largest 
automotive producer-turning out roughly 
11  million cars, trucks and buses. In contrast, 
the u.s. last year produced about 8 million 
units (including 6  Y2  million autos) -the 
smallest number of the past 20 years, and a 
striking comedown for a country which 
accounted for three-fourths of total world 
production in the aftermath of World War II. 
Japan's performance in 1980 was led by 
exports, which represented more than half of 
Japanese production, and which soared more 
than 30 percent in a year when worldwide 
auto demand dropped about 10 percent. 
Imported cars (three-fourths Japanese) took 
over more than one-fourth of the U.S. market 
(see chart) -and roughly half of the style-
setting California market. As a final blow, 
Japanese and other imports accounted for 
one seventh of all the cars sold in Michigan, 
the heartland of the u.S. auto industry. 
Domestic sales and production data, conse-
quently, made very disturbing reading in 
1980. U.S. auto producers lost an unprece-
dented $4 bi II ion last year, and at year-end 
one-fourth of the automotive workforce was 
jobless. Cries of alarm soon resounded 
through the halls of Congress, because this 
key industry and its suppliers account for 
roughly one-sixth of the nation's workforce. 
Detroit's products and services represent 8V2 
percent of  GNP and 25 percent of retail sales. 
The industry uses 21  percent of the nation's 
steel, 60 percent of its synthetic rubber, 25 
percent of its glass, 20 percent of its machine 
tools, and so on. 
Quotas and their effects 
As quota legislation began to move through 
Congress, Japan responded this month by 
announcing that it would "voluntarily" limit 
imports for the next several years. The plan 
calls for a 7.7-percent decline in Japanese 
imports, with Japan limiting car shipments to 
the u.S. to 1.68 million units in the present 
year (April 1981-April 1982). The following 
year, shipments would be held to the same 
number plus 16.5 percent of the year-to-year 
growth in U.S. auto sales-and the year after 
that, Japan would monitor its shipments 
monthly to "protect against surges." 
The domestic auto industry, which had re-
cently deserted its long-held free-trade prin-
ciples as exports declined and imports 
mounted, claimed that import limitations 
would be needed only as a stop-gap mea-
sure-since Detroit would be able to com-
pete equally again once it completes its pres-
ent massive investment in "import fighters." 
Critics of  the agreement (such as Mi  Iton 
Friedman in Newsweek) nonetheless argue 
that "voluntary" restrictions should be re-
sisted because they are a form of tax -an 
imposed transfer from purchasers to pro-
ducers of cars. Friedman cites a precedent in 
the windfall gains obtained by Taiw"anese 
clothing producers who purchase export 
quotas under the agreements which limit 
Taiwanese clothing exports to this country. 
In the present case,  import restrictions mean 
that the u.S. market for japanese cars will be 
about 400,000 units short this year. To many 
industry analysts, this means that prices of 
those scarce cars wi  II rise about 5 to 10 per-
cent in the near future-and that prices of 
competing American makes will rise a com-
parable amount as u.s. producers (under the 
Japanese price umbrella) try to increase their 
badly depleted margins. But these increases 
in new-car prices, while improvingthe health 
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worsen the inflation spiral as indexation 
formulas transform the price hikes into higher 
private spending for payrolls and higher 
government spending for transfer payments. 
In a word, "import fighters" don't auto-
matically translate into "inflation fighters." 
Detroit's failure and . .. 
How did Detroit get into its present fix? A 
partial answer is provided by columnist 
George Will-"ln 1973 Egypt attacked Israel 
and devastated Detroit." The massive change 
in the world petroleum market after 1973 
favored auto producers who made fuel-
efficient cars (Japan) and worked against 
those who made gas-guzzling monsters 
(Detroit). Until 1973, the North American 
market was the province of  the large V-8, and 
the economies of large-scale production 
effectively protected this country from sub-
stantial import sales.  But the enforced shift to 
small cars then reversed that advantage. 
Detroit generally fai led to meet the challenge 
until after the second (Iranian) oil shock, for 
several reasons. The industry required long 
lead times (and massive amounts of money) 
for engineering and design of new models 
that were major departures from existing 
models. Also, its customers, with Detroit's 
encouragement, showed a continued prefer-
ence for traditional models. And more impor-
tantly, Detroit responded somewhat slowly to 
the growing demand of some buyers for fuel-
efficient models, simply because fuel didn't 
seem like much of a problem after the initial 
price shock. The pump price of gasoline (in 
real terms) remained practically stable for a 
half-decade, because of a government policy 
which kept gas prices artificially low through 
regulation. 
... Japan's opportunity 
Japan meanwhile offered a growing supply of 
products which offered high quality (with 
flawless paint jobs, for example) as well as 
reliability (with a low rate of  warranty claims). 
With high gas mileage, plus those other seIl-
ing points, Japan offered products which 
were perfectly positioned in the marketplace 
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when American consumers recognized the 
meaning of  the latest OPEC price shock and 
domestic price decontrol. 
And the price of  the Japanese product was 
right. Even after paying high transportation 
and insurance costs when shipping into the 
U.S market, Japanese producers boasted a 
major production-line cost advantage of per-
haps $1,000 to $1,500 per car, primarily 
because of wage differentials. The average 
Japanese auto worker makes only about half 
as much per hour as his American counter-
part (compared with a two-thirds ratio in 
manufacturing  generally). Given 1978 levels 
of hourly wage rates, and given an estimated 
125 manhours of production time for a sub-
compact car, the comparative U.S. and Ja-
panese production-labor costs in 1978 
amounted to $1,581  and $817, respective-
ly-a  differential of $764 for labor costs 
alone. 
Japan's market share has not grown steadily, 
however, but rather in fits and starts since 
1973, reflecting the changes in the relative 
strengths of  the Japanese and American cur-
rencies. When the yen declined against the 
dollar in late 1979 and early 1980, the Japan-
ese share of  the U.S. market rose to a new 
peak; but when the yen turned around and 
rose against the dollar, Japan's auto-market 
share dropped from 23 to 16 percent between, 
Ju Iy and October 1980. From Detroit's stand~~ 
point, a cheaper dollar thus would be wel-
come-although that factor appears secon-
dary in light of the major long-term cost 
advantages in Japan's favor. 
Detroit's response 
Detroit is moving to meet the challenge with 
the greatest restructuring of operations in the 
industry's history, featuring automated factor-
ies, downsized cars, and the latest forms of 
computer technology. By 1984, the industry 
plans to build 30 new engine lines, 19 new 
transmission lines, and 89 new assembly 
lines-and this will require more than $70 
billion that is hard to find in today's depressed 
market. But as a resu It, by 1985 everyone of r---
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Detroit's current models will be replaced 
with entirely redesigned vehicles offering 
greatly improved fuel economy. Automakers 
expect to push the average fuel economy of 
their fleets to more than 40 miles per gallon 
by the turn of the century-a vast improve-
ment over the 14 mpg average of 1974. And 
practically every new model will feature 
front-drive, a concept that permits the largest 
possible passenger space within a given 
exterior shell. 
For its investment, Detroit expects substantial 
increases in efficiency, with major declines in 
labor and resource inputs over the next half-
decade. General Motors, for example, with 
its forthcoming S  car, hopes to slash its cur-
rent fastest assembly time almost in half, to 
about 10 hours from the 18 hours now re-
quired for an average equipped Chevette. (By 
comparison, Chrysler'S 1979 average as-
sembly time was over 36 hours per vehicle.) 
With productivity gains of five percent an-
nually, about 200,000 auto-manufacturing 
jobs could be eliminated by 1985 -roughly 
equivalent to the number of jobs lost during 
1980's severe cyclical decline. 
Downsizing and automation also have sober-
ing implications for many supplier industries. 
Four-cylinder engines require the machining 
of  only half  the pistons, rings and valves of  the 
eight-cylinder models they replace-and 
with these smaller and lighter engines, the 
demand for iron castings may drop by half 
within the decade. Again, each new compact 
weighs about one-half ton less than the 
model it replaces, so that the autos of 1990 
may use only half as much steel as today's 
models use. 
Whither Detroit? 
Moreover, Detroit seems committed to pro-
ducing more and more of its "domestic" cars 
in foreign plants. For example, Ford's new 
world car, although advertised as an "import 
fighter" in this country, contains parts pro-
duced in 12 different countries throughout 
the world. Much production is already shift-
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rates and favorable government subsidies 
help lower automakers' costs on a worldwide 
basis, enabling them to reduce production 
and jobs in higher-wage areas. In this respect, 
Mexican engine plants by 1985 should be 
capable of producing 1.7 million engines 
annually-about four times the number 
needed for the local market. 
If U.S. auto demand grew rapidly enough, 
these various trends might appear less wor-
risome for Detroit. But with a national fleet of 
110m  i  II ion cars, and with one or more cars in 
83V2  percent of all households, the domestic 
market may be nearing saturation., Current 
estimates of market growth range between 1 
and 2% percent a year-the latter equalling 
the average industry growth of  the past 50 
years. The more optimistic estimates assume 
a strong replacement market, reasonably 
enough, with the scrappage rate rising as 
older gas-guzzling models are sentto the 
junkyard. But the question remains how the 
market growth of the next decade wi  II be 
divided -whether Detroit's "import  fighters" 
will take the lion's share, or whether Japanese 
and other imports will again (as in the 1970's) 
skim off the entire increase in sales. 
By 1985 or 1990, Detroit will be completely 
transformed. (Ironically, this suggests thatthe 
mature American industry could logically use 
an infant-industry argument in fighting for 
quotas on imports, because Detroit's 
1982-85 models actually represent an en-
tirely new industry.) But the U.S. auto in-
dustry, continuing the recent trend, will 
manufacture more and more of its products in 
plants scattered around the world, rather than 
in those concentrated in the Great Lakes 
states. Locational shifts, plus downsizing and 
automation, thus presage redundant workers 
and redundant factories-in autos, steel, 
rubber, glass, etc.-in the nation's industrial 
heartland. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,907  6.4 
8,407  7.2 
2,541  7.3 
5,438  11.7 
- 1,546  - 6.3 
655  77.6 
131  2.0 
373  2.4 
- 3,680  - 8.3 
2,430  - 7.8 
4,191  16.1 
12,247  18.9 
12,222  21.8 
7,029  30.3 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency ( -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





4/22/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  34 
228.0  88 
n.a.  53 
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